HOW VALUES SHAPE PEOPLE'S VIEWS OF DEMOCRACY:
A GLOBAL COMPARISON

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ABSTRACT:

Using survey data from some 50 societies worldwide, this chapter examines the impact of values on people's orientations towards democracy. We find (1) that a set of 'emancipative values' powerfully shapes people's orientations towards democracy and (2) that they do so in the same way across cultural zones and at both the individual level and the societal level (with the effects at both levels reinforcing each other). Specifically, emancipative values shift people's notion of democracy towards an ever more uncontestedly liberal notion: this notion emphasizes the freedoms that empower people as the prime features of democracy. Moreover, emancipative values make people more critical in the assessment of their country's actual state of democracy. In combination, then, emancipative values generate a 'critical-liberal demand' for democracy. This critical-liberal demand proves to be a formidable predictor of democracy and its quality at the system level. Finally, we find that the liberal-minding and critical-minding effects of emancipative values do not vanish under control of indicators of cognitive mobilization, nor are these effects conditioned by a long experience with democracy. On a more theoretical note, critical-liberal demands for democracy are linked to emancipative values in a broader process of human empowerment.

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INTRODUCTION

There is plenty of evidence that overt preferences for democracy have become almost ubiquitous across the globe (Klingemann 1999; Inglehart 2003; Dalton, Shin & Jou 2008). But, as a recent contribution by Welzel and Klingemann (2009) has shown, the prevalence of democratic preferences shows a positive impact on democracy if—and only if--these preferences are tied to a set of 'emancipative values.' According to this finding, even widespread preferences for democracy coexist easily with a lack of democracy whenever these preferences are decoupled from emancipative values.

Welzel and Klingemann explain this pattern by the nature of emancipative values, which place a general emphasis on freedom of choice. Thus, whenever democratic preferences are decoupled from emancipative values, people prefer democracy for other reasons than an intrinsic valuation of democracy's defining freedoms. In these cases, it is easy for power holders to satisfy people's democratic preferences by sheer democratic rhetoric that depicts as democratic what in fact is not democratic, at least not in a liberal sense of democracy (Held 2006). Hence, if we want to favor democracy in a substantively liberal sense, it is important to know what additional qualities democratic preferences must meet in order to be mobilizable only in favor of liberal democracy, and not something else.

At any rate, overt preferences for democracy in and by themselves are not informative about the goals for which these preferences can be mobilized. Further qualifications are needed to measure preferences for democracy that involve a commitment to democracy's defining freedoms. Only if we do so, can we have some confidence that these preferences will not be mobilized against democracy in the name of democracy.

Inspired by these reflections, Welzel and Klingemann introduced a qualified measure of democratic preferences that downweighs overt preferences for democracy to the extent that they are decoupled from emancipative values. This was done under the assumption that emancipative values emphasize equal freedoms for everyone, so that democratic preferences cannot be mobilized to restrict or abandon democratic freedoms if they are coupled with emancipative values. And indeed, it was found that when overt preferences are tied to emancipative values, this is highly consequential for the scope of democratic freedoms in a society: in every society in which the democratic preferences of at least a third of the population are coupled with an emphasis on emancipative values, democratic freedoms are institutionalized in a substantive way to at least 50 percent of the known maximum.

In light of this evidence, it is plausible to assume that democratic preferences are only consequential in connection with emancipative values because these values "enlighten" people's understanding of democracy, giving it a decidedly liberal sense. However, this is just a plausible assumption and not more. Direct evidence for its

validity has not been available until recently because the WVS never fielded a question asking people what they understand under the term "democracy." Such a question was fielded only in the fifth and most recent round of the WVS.

Against this background, this chapter demonstrates for the first time that emancipative values do indeed shape people's preferences for democracy and that they do so in a two-fold way. For one, stronger emancipative values lead people to define democracy more exclusively in liberal terms, that is, in terms of the freedoms through which democracy empowers ordinary people. Next, people with strong emancipative values have internalized hard evaluation standards to assess the democratic quality of the institutions under which they live, which makes them critical in rating the quality of democracy in their society. By their inherent logic, then, emancipative values combine a strongly liberal understanding of democracy with a critical rating of the state of democracy. In combination, the liberal notion of democracy and the critical rating of democracy merge into a "*critical-liberal*" desire for democracy. The critical-liberal desire for democracy is, as we will see, rooted in emancipative values more than in anything else.

To demonstrate these points, the chapter is organized into three sections. The first section introduces three new measures of three distinct aspects in people's orientations towards democracy: the strength of the desire for democracy, the notion of what democracy means, and the rating of one's society's level of democracy. The section also discusses how these aspects can be combined to measure a critical-liberal desire for democracy. We will argue that this particular type of a democratic desire is important to mobilize a population for democratic progress: if people's rating of their society's democracy is critical, it is easier to mobilize their democratic desire for democratic progress; and if people understand democracy in liberal terms, it is more likely that their desires focus indeed on democratic progress and not on some other things that are only propagated in the name of democracy. Section two briefly summarizes the hypotheses of how we think emancipative values affect these orientations. The section also outlines the analytical steps to examine these hypotheses. The third section presents the results. The chapter finishes with a concluding section.

1.   New Measures of Orientations towards Democracy
1.1   *Popular Notions of Democracy*

The recent literature raises criticism against standard measures of democratic mass preferences, arguing that preferences for democracy are not very telling as long as one does not know what people understand under the term 'democracy' (Schedler & Sarsfeld 2006; Bratton & Mattes 2001). In response to this criticism, scholars of the Democracy Barometer Surveys are looking more intensely at how notions of democracy

vary across societies from different culture zones. So far, these analyses came to comforting results, showing that people around the world, including such 'unlikely places' as Afghanistan, define democracy in liberal terms, focusing on the freedoms that empower ordinary people (Bratton & Gyami-Boda 2005; Dalton, Jou & Shin 2008; Diamond 2008). If these analyses are accurate, we do not have to worry that different desires lurk behind people's regime preference when people express a preference for democracy. The liberal understanding seems to have become the universal understanding of democracy.

However, this finding is at odds with the evidence provided by Welzel and Klingemann: democratic mass preferences are consequential for democracy if—and only if—these preferences are inspired by emancipative values. This evidence suggests that notions of democracy vary and do so in consequential ways with the prevalence of emancipative values. But why the Democracy Barometer Surveys find such little variation as concerns the notions of democracy? One reason for the invariance might be that most questions about meanings of democracy ask respondents to judge only things as definitional properties of democracy that are anyways characteristics of "Western" democracies. Such characteristics include free and fair elections, civil liberties, a multi-party system, an independent judiciary, press freedom and so forth. But what about asking for bread-and-butter and law-and-order issues that are often widely popular but have little to do with democracy? And what if we ask for features that are in plain contradiction to a liberal notion of democracy, like the political intervention of the military and religious leaders? Do we then still find the liberal notion of democracy to be so dominant?

In light of the "Asian values" debate and Huntington's "clash of civilization" thesis (see Welzel 2011 for a detailed analysis), one might suspect that even though the liberal notion of democracy is considerably supported everywhere, the "West" is still unique in how exclusively people understand democracy in liberal terms. Outside the West, people might have a less focused notion of democracy. Next to liberal goods, they might include various other goods in their notion of democracy, some of which might actually conflict with liberal goods. If this is so, the Western/Non-Western faultline might be in *how exlusively* people define democracy in liberal terms. This is an important point for the channeling of people's democratic desires into a democratic direction: the less exclusively people's notions of democracy focus on liberal goods, the higher is the risk that people's democratic desires are mobilized for non-democratic goods in the name of democracy.

The evidence is inconclusive on this point because, until recently, no cross-national survey has confronted respondents with non-liberal and even anti-liberal notions of democracy--without noticing the respondents that these are non-liberal and anti-liberal notions.

To find out how exclusively people define democracy in liberal terms, we have to ask for non-liberal and even anti-liberal goods as possible definitions of democracy. To meet this task, the WVS fielded for the first time in round five a question with ten items to categorize people's notions of democracy. The question is worded as follows:

> "Many things may be desirable, but not all of them are essential characteristics of democracy. Please tell me for each of the following things how essential you think it is as a characteristic of democracy. Use this scale where 1 means 'not at all an essential characteristic of democracy' and 10 means it definitely is 'an essential characteristic of democracy'" (*read out and code one answer for each*):

		Not an essential characteristic of democracy							An essential characteristic of democracy		
V152.	Governments tax the rich and subsidize the poor.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
V153.	Religious authorities ultimately interpret the laws.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
V154.	People choose their leaders in free elections.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
V155.	People receive state aid for unemployment.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
V156.	The army takes over when government is incompetent.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
V157.	Civil rights protect people's liberty against oppression.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
V158.	The economy is prospering.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
V159.	Criminals are severely punished.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
V160.	People can change the laws in referendums.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
V161.	Women have the same rights as men.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10

These items were designed to measure the popularity of four different notions of democracy, as depicted in Figure 1:

(1) a *liberal* notion when people define democracy in terms of the freedoms that empower people;

(2) a *social* notion when people define democracy in terms of redistributive features that are part of the welfare state;

(3) a *populist* notion when people define democracy in terms of bread-and-butter and law-and-order issues that are often widely popular but have little to do with democracy;

(4) an *authoritarian* notion when people define democracy in terms of anti-democratic extra powers, reserved to exclusionary groups such as the military and religious leaders.

As Figure 1 shows, the liberal notion is meant to be covered by the items referring to free elections (V154), referenda votes (V160), civil rights (V157) and equal rights (V161). The social notion is covered by the items addressing state benefits (V155) and economic redistribution (V152). The populist notion is included in the items relating to economic prosperity as a bread-and-butter issue (V158) and fighting crime as a law-and-order issue (V159). And the authoritarian notion is covered by the items favoring military intervention (V156) and religious authority (V153) as defining elements of democracy.

(Figure 1 about here)

From the viewpoint of a 'Western' textbook definition of democracy, the liberal notion reflects the proper understanding of democracy as "liberal democracy" (see Alexander and Welzel 2011 for a detailed justification of this notion as the most appropriate one). The liberal notion focuses on the freedoms that empower ordinary people. So if people say they prefer democracy over any other regime, one would intuitively assume that this preference can only be mobilized for the liberal features that actually define democracy. But this is only true if people understand democracy more in liberal terms than in alternative terms. What matters, then, is that the liberal understanding of democracy trumps alternative understandings in ordinary people's mind. Only then can one be sure that democratic mass preferences cannot be harnessed for non-democratic or even anti-democratic goals.

The whole issue is a matter of relative priorities, so our concern is to measure *how exclusively* people define democracy in liberal terms. To do so the tension between the liberal notion of democracy and alternative notions has to be taken into account. But, on a conceptual level, this tension is characterized by some subtleties that need consideration.

Relative to the liberal notion, an authoritarian notion of democracy is directly contradictory. Thus, one can qualify someone's notion of democracy as exclusively liberal only if the person emphasizes the liberal features of democracy and at the same time rejects the authoritarian ones. This means that the authoritarian notion has to be counted with *full weight* against the liberal notion.

The popular notion of democracy defines features as democratic that have nothing to do with the definition of democracy. Thus, if we want to measure how exclusively people define democracy in liberal terms, the populist notion has to be counted against the liberal one, too. Yet, populism should not be counted against liberalism with the same weight as authoritarianism. The reason is that, while the authoritarian notion is plainly *anti*-liberal, the populist one is just *non*-liberal: it *rivals but does not contradict* the liberal notion, indicating a lower degree of tension. The existing but lesser tension should be modeled by counting the populist notion against the liberal one with a lower weight than the authoritarian one.

The authoritarian notion of democracy *contradicts* the liberal notion and is hence plainly *anti*-liberal. The populist notion of democracy *rivals* but does not contradict the liberal one and is hence just *non*-liberal rather than anti-liberal. By contrast, the social notion of democracy is *neutral* to the liberal notion. The social notion addresses redistributive features whose endorsement and rejection both are compatible with a liberal notion of democracy. Endorsement of the social features is compatible with a *social-liberal* notion of democracy. Refusal of the social features is compatible with a *market-liberal* notion of democracy. Since the social-liberal and the

market-liberal notions both are liberal notions of democracy, one cannot narrow down the liberal notion to any of these two. In other words, any position towards redistributive features is equally compatible with a liberal notion of democracy. Because of this neutrality, the social notion of democracy should *not* be counted against the liberal notion--if one wants to measure the dominance of the liberal over contradictory and rival definitions, but not over compatible definitions.

(Table 1 about here)

The exploratory factor analysis of the ten democracy items shown in Table 1 confirms these conceptual distinctions. To preserve consistency with the 0-to-1.0 scales used throughout this book, the original 1-to-10 item ratings have been normalized into a range from minimum 0 to maximum 1.0. For the factor analysis, these rescaled item ratings have been mean-centered. This has been done to isolate relative priorities in the respondents' item ratings from the absolute levels of the ratings. Consider two respondents, Li Minh and Sandeep. Li Minh rates the civil rights item .80 and Sandeep rates it .60. Thus, it seems that Li Minh assigns civil rights a .20 scale points higher priority than does Sandeep. But Li Minh rated many items relatively high, so her mean rating over all items is .60. By contrast, Sandeep rated most items relatively low, having a mean rating over all items of .40. Relative to their mean ratings over all items, both Li Minh and Sandeep assign civil rights the same priority: both prioritize civil rights by +.20 above their other item ratings. Thus, if one is interested in rating priorities rather than absolute item ratings, the mean ratings over all items must be standardized across respondents. This is done by subtracting a respondent's mean rating over all items from each single item rating. This yields positive mean-distance scores for higher-than-average rated items and negative mean-distance scores for lower-than-avergae rated items.

Using these mean-centered items, the factor analyses reveal three dimensions of popular notions of democracy. The first dimension represents a direct polarity between the liberal notion and the authoritarian notion of democracy: the liberal items load on the positive pole, the authoritarian ones on the negative pole of this liberal versus authoritarian dimension. The second dimension represents the populist notion and the third one the social notion of democracy.

Yet, we do not measure how notions democracy are organized in people's mind without an external without an external reference standard. Instead, we use the concept of liberal democracy, as outlined by Alexander and Welzel (2011), and measure people's notions against this reference standard. According to this standard, the liberal notion of democracy is—conceptually speaking--in full contradiction to an authoritarian notion and in partial contradiction to a populist notion, while it is compatible with a social notion because, in its economic policies, liberal democracy can be either market-

liberal or social-liberal. Hence, authoritarian and populist notions are both counted against the liberal one, yet in such a way that the authoritarian notion is counted by double the weight as the populist one. By contrast, the social notion of democracy is not counted against the liberal one.

This index construction reflects the conceptual logic of liberal democracy. If there are societies in which many people do not organize their notions in this way, this does not invalidate the concept of democracy but rather reveals that these people have not internalized it. Thus, we measure people's notions of democracy against the yardstick of democracy's conceptual logic. If people's own notions are organized in deviation from this logic, their index scores will be low—and rightly so when the conceptual logic is the standard of measurement.

1.2   Measuring How Exclusively People Define Democracy in Liberal Terms

Figure 1 shows the different levels of generalization to create the various indices of people's notions of democracy. At the highest level of generalization, liberal notions of democracy are qualified for their exclusiveness by counting them against authoritarian and populist notions of democracy.

To begin with, we create an index for how strongly people rate on average the four liberal items of democracy, without any further enrichment. This index measures just the strength of the liberal notion of democracy. It is labeled 'liberal notion of democracy' and has a scale range from 0, for the case that someone gives the lowest rating ('not at all an essential characteristic of democracy') to each of the four liberal items, to 1.0, for the case that a respondent gives the highest ('absolutely an essential characteristic') to each of them:

$$LNI = (FER + ERR + CLR + RVR) / 4$$

LNI: Liberal Notion Index
FER: Free Elections Rating
ERR: Equal Rights Rating
CLR: Civil Liberties Rating
RVR: Referenda Votes Rating
Note: All scales normalized into a range from minimum 0 to maximum 1.0

In the second step, we calculate the extent to which respondents refuse the authoritarian, and for that matter: plainly anti-liberal, notion of democracy. The resulting scale is at minimum 0, if a respondent gives the two authoritarian items the highest rating, and at maximum 1.0, if a respondent gives these two items the lowest rating. To obtain this scale polarity, the average rating of the two authoritarian items has to be subtracted from 1:

$$\textbf{\textit{NANI}} = 1 - ((\textit{RAR} + \textit{MIR}) / 2)$$

NANI: Non-Authoritarian Notion Index
RAR: Religious Authority Rating
MIR: Military Intervention Rating

Next, we calculate the extent to which respondents refuse the populist, and for that matter: non-liberal, notion of democracy. The resulting scale is at minimum 0, if a respondent gives the two populist items the highest rating, and at maximum 1.0, if a respondent gives these two items the lowest rating. To obtain this scale polarity, the average rating of the two populist items has to be subtracted from 1:

$$\textbf{\textit{NPNI}} = 1 - ((\textit{BBR} + \textit{LOR}) / 2)$$

NPNI: Non-Populist Notion Index
BBR: Bread-and-Butter Rating
LOR: Law-and-Order Rating

Finally, we qualify people's liberal notion of democracy for how much they refuse the authoritarian notion as well as the populist notion of democracy. As explained above, populist notions of democracy are only half as contradictory to liberal ones as is true for authoritarian notions. Thus, we qualify liberal for non-populist notions by only half the weight that we enrich liberal for non-authoritarian notions:

$$\textbf{\textit{ELNI}} = (\textit{LNI} + .66 * \textit{NANI} + .34 * \textit{NPNI}) / 2$$

ELNI: Exclusively Liberal Notion Index
LNI: Liberal Notion Index
NANI: Non-Authoritarian Notion Index
NPNI: Non-Populist Notion Index

The resulting index measures to what extent people's notion of democracy is liberal and at the same time non-authoritarian as well as non-populist. It measures how exclusively liberal people's notion of democracy is, so we label the index 'exclusively liberal notion of democracy.' The index ranges from minimum 0, when respondents rate all liberal items the lowest and all authoritarian and populist items the highest, to 1.0, when respondents rate all liberal items the highest and all authoritarian and populist items the lowest. The midpoint of the index is at .50 and indicates equal strength of liberal and alternative notions of democracy. Scores below .50 indicate that alternative notions dominate over the liberal one; scores above .50 indicate the opposite.

1.3   *Qualifying Desires for Democracy*

Round five of the WVS introduced a threefold distinction of how people orientate themselves towards democracy. How people understand democracy is just one of these three orientations. The other two are how strongly people desire to live in a democracy and as how democratic they rate their given society. A person's complete orientation towards democracy is defined by the combination of these three orientations. And, with respect to its possible mobilizational impact, each of the three orientations can be meaningfully interpreted only in connection with the other two. For example, if a person expresses a strong desire to live in a democracy, we might conclude that this person can be mobilized for goals that are propagated in the name of democracy. Yet, as long as we do not know what notion of democracy the person holds, we do not know which goals can be sold to this person as democratic ones. Moreover, if we do not know how critical the person rates her society's democracy, we have no idea how easy it is to win this person's desire for democratic goals because the person in question might see her desire met. Hence, how the three aspects combine is of particular relevance from a social movement perspective that focuses on the conditions to channel democratizing mass pressures towards liberal outcomes.

To measure the other two chief aspects of democratic orientations—the desire for democracy and the rating of democracy--two more questions have been fielded for the first time in round five of the WVS. They read as follows:

V162. How important is it for you to live in a country that is governed democratically? On this scale where 1 means it is "not at all important" and 10 means "absolutely important" what position would you choose? (*Code one number*):

Not at all   Absolutely
important   important
1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9   10

V163. And how democratically is this country being governed today? Again using a scale from 1 to 10, where 1 means that it is "not at all democratic" and 10 means that it is "completely democratic," what position would you choose? (*Code one number*):

Not at all   Completely
democratic   democratic
1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9   10

The first of the two questions is important in combination with notions of democracy because the combination reveals how strongly people's desires for democracy are motivated by the various notions of democracy. Only when people's desires for democracy are motivated by a liberal notion of democracy can we assume that these desires are mobilized in favor of the freedoms that define democracy. Where democracy is not in place or is deficient despite a strong popular desire for democracy, this might be partly so because people's desire is not motivated by a liberal notion of democracy. If so, these desires are not targeted at the freedoms that define democracy, in which case it were not surprising that *seemingly* strong mass preferences for

democracy do not translate into corresponding mass pressures to democratize. This would solve a major puzzle in the comparative study of democracy: the coexistence of widespread desires for democracy with lack of actual democracy.

The second of the above survey questions is important so that we can see whether and to what extent people's rating of their society's level of democracy exceeds or falls short of the actual level of democracy. This allows us to estimate how critical people assess democracy. Only when people assess their society's level of democracy more critical than it actually is, can one mobilize their democrastic desire for pressures to improve the given state of democracy.

These new questions allow us to implement a stepwise substantiation of popular desires for democracy, according to the following rationale. In order to mobilize popular desires that pressure indeed for liberal democracy, and nothing else, these demands must be tied to a liberal, and preferably *exclusively* liberal, notion of democracy. Thus, we have to qualify the desire for democracy by how exclusively people define democracy in liberal terms, discounting given desires to the extent they are detached from an exclusively liberal notion of democracy. Doing so allows us to speak about democratic desires in a qualified manner: talking specifically about '*liberal* desires for democracy.'

Technically, we first bring the responses to the desire question into our standard scale range from 0, for the case someone finds it 'not at all important' to live in a democracy, to 1.0, for the case someone finds this 'absolutely important.' Then we weight these responses for how exclusively people understand democracy in liberal terms, using the 'exclusively liberal notion of democracy' index:

$$LDD \ = \ DDI * ELNI$$

LDD: Liberal Demand for Democracy
DDI: Democratic Demand Index
ELNI: Exclusively Liberal Notion Index

The resulting index measures popular desires in a qualified way, evidencing not only how strongly people desire democracy but how strongly they desire a truly liberal version of democracy. The index runs from minimum 0, for the case that someone *either* does not wish to live in a democracy at all *or* has an entirely non-liberal notion of democracy, to maximum 1.0, for the case that someone *both* wishes strongly to live in a democracy *and* has a truly liberal notion of democracy.

1.4   Critical Rating of Democracy

Even the latter qualification might not be sufficient to capture how easily people could be mobilized for democratic improvements. There might be a desire for democracy and

it might be liberally motivated, yet when people mistakenly rate their society as democratic, then even this liberally motivated desire cannot be mobilized for pressures towards *more* liberal democracy. For people perceive their desire fulfilled in this case and fulfilled desires cannot be mobilized for changes of the status quo. In other words, the desire for democracy has not only to be coupled with a liberal notion of democracy but also with a critical rating of democracy. Only then is there a fertile psychological basis to mobilize democratic mass pressures.

One does not know whether people rate their society's level of democracy more or less critical than it really is without relating their rating to information about their society's actual level of democracy. If we accept the index of substantive democratic rights outlined by Alexander and Welzel (2011) as a particularly valid measure of a society's actual level of democracy, we can use this information as a yardstick to evaluate how critical people rate their society's level of democracy. The basic idea is that ordinary people's democracy rating is the less critical, the higher they rate their society's level of democracy above the actual level. Consider a Chinese respondent who rates her society's level of democracy very high, say at .80 on the normalized ten-point rating question. Assessed against the fact that China's actual level of democracy is very low, at .01 scale points on the democratic rights index, we would consider this respondent's democracy rating as very *un*critical. This respondent is unlikely to be mobilized for the advancement of democracy, even though she expresses a strong desire to live in a democracy.

Now consider the opposite case of a Dutch who rates her society's level of democracy very low, say at .20 on the rating question. Assessed against the fact that The Netherland's actual democracy level is very high, at .90 scale points on the democratic rights index, one would judge this respondent's democracy rating very critical.

More generally, ordinary people's democracy rating is the more critical, the lower they rate their society's level of democracy *below* the actual level. The more critical respondents rate their society's level of democracy, the easier is it to mobilize their democratic desires for further improvements of their society's democratic quality.

According to this logic, one can estimate people's criticality by calculating how much they rate their society's democracy level above or below its actual level. Basically, this means to calculate the difference between the respondent's rating of her society's democracy level and the actual level as given by the democratic rights index:

CRI = (($DRI - RDR$) + 1) / 2

CRI: Critical Rating Index
DRI: Democratic Rights Index
RDR: Respondents' Democracy Rating

Upon initial calculation, the difference index ranges from -1.0 to +1.0. To transform this range into the normalized range from 0 and to 1.0, first a constant 1 is added. This yields a scale range from 0 to 2.0. After division by 2, the scale obtains the preferred range from 0 to 1.0. On this index, the midpoint at .50 indicates that respondents rate their society's level of democracy equal to its actual level. Scores approach 0, indicating decreasing criticalness, the higher respondents rate their society's democracy level above the actual level. A score of exactly 0 indicates that a respondent rates her society's level of democracy at the maximum when the actual level is at the minimum: the least critical rating possible. A score of 1.0 indicates the oppositve constellation: a respondent rating her society's democracy level at the minimum when the actual level is at the maximum—the most critical rating possible.

In the final step of qualification, we qualify liberal desires for democracy for how much they are based on a critical rating of democracy, speaking about the desire for democracy in an even more qualified way: the '*critical-liberal* desire for democracy.' This critical-liberal desire is particularly important from a social movement perspective because it indicates how well prepared the motivational constitution of individuals and entire societies is in order to mobilize them for pressures to advance liberal democracy. This motivational predisposition depends on three conditions, each of which varies by degree:

(1)   how strongly people wish to live in a democracy determines the extent to which goals framed in the name of democracy appeal to people;
(2)   how exclusively people define democracy in liberal terms determines to what extent people's desire for democracy can solely be mobilized for liberal goals;
(3)   how critical people rate their society's level of democracy determines how easily people's desire for democracy can be mobilized for improvements in a society's democratic quality.

The 'critical-liberal desire for democracy' measures the combination of all three conditions on an index from minimum 0 to maximum 1.0. The index approaches 0 the less a respondent wishes to live in a democracy *or* the less she understands democracy in liberal terms *or* the less critically she rates her society's level of democracy. The index approaches 1.0 the more a respondent wishes to live in a democracy *and* the more exclusively she understands democracy in liberal terms *and* the more critically she rates her society's level of democracy.

Technically, this index is calculated by weighting the strength of the respondent's desire for democracy for (1) the liberalness of this respondent's notion of democracy and (2) the criticalness of her rating of democracy:

CLDI $= DDI * ELNI * CRI$

CLDI: Critical-Liberal Demand Index
DDI: Democratic Demand Index
ELNI: Exclsuively Liberal Notion Index
CRI: Critical Rating Index

The logic of this index construction is a substantiation logic as outlined by Alexander and Welzel (2011). In this logic, an exclusively liberal notion of democracy is a substantiating quality of the desire for democracy, generating a *liberal* desire for democracy. And a critical rating of democracy is a substantiating quality of the liberal desire for democracy, generating a *critical-liberal* desire for democracy. Figure 2 provides a graphical illustration of this substantiation logic. As detailed elsewhere, when the constituents of an index are substantiating qualities to each other rather than supplementary components, an interactive combination, as in weighting, is preferable to an additive combination, as in averaging.

(Figure 2 about here)

Technically, this substantiation logic is implemented by weighting the base index for the substantiating quality in question. The qualified index will always be in the same scale range (always between 0 and 1.0) as its base index but will usually yield a lower score because the weighting procedure downgrades the base index for lack of the substantiating quality.

2.   Hypotheses and Analytical Design

Our main interest is to see how emancipative values vary people's orientations towards democracy across societies from different culture zones and at different levels of analyses, societal and individual. In this context, we expect four hypotheses about the impact of emancipative values to hold true. These hypotheses phrase what we expect are inherent impulses of emancipative values in the logic of the human empowerment framework. The root assumption in the logic of human empowerment is that, because emancipative values emphasize freedoms, the rights that enact these freedoms and that define liberal democracy become intrinsically appealing under emancipative values. This root assumption translates into the five more specific hypotheses:

(1)   Emancipative values base people's desire for democracy on an increasingly liberal notion of democracy.
(2)   Emancipative values connect people's desire for democracy with an increasingly critical rating of the actual level of democracy.

(3) Emancipative values have these effects at both the individual level and the societal level, yet the mechanism of contextual self-enforcement applies: individual-level emancipative values impact democratic orientations the more in the above described ways, the more prevalent these values are at the societal level.

(4) At both levels of analysis, emancipative values are the strongest shaping force of democratic orientations against relevant controls.

These hypotheses will be tested by a graphical examination of the combined individual-level and societal-level effects of emancipative values, separately for the three orientations towards democracy—desire, notion, rating—as well as for their combination: the critical-liberal desire for democracy. After the graphical analyses, multi-level models will be used to test the effects of emancipative values against important control variables.

The most important control variable at the societal level is democratic traditions. To assume a strong effect of democratic traditions on people's orientations towards democracy is plausible from the viewpoint of institutional learning. From this point of view, adopting the "proper" orientations towards democracy is a matter of being socialized into a long collective experience with democratic institutions (Rustow 1970; Rohrschneider 1996). To test this proposition, we use the 'democratic traditions index' introduced by Gerring et al. (2005) under the label 'democracy stock.' This index measures each society's historically accumulated experience with democracy. As outlined in Welzel and Inglehart (2010), the democratic tradition index is also a formidable measure of Western cultural traditions. Thus, when using this index we do not need an additional measure to depict cultural differences along a Western/Non-Western fault line: on the democratic traditions index, this fault line is clearly visible, with Western societies having on average much longer democratic traditions than non-Western societies.

At the individual level, influential authors give people's orientations towards democracy a primarily cognitive reading: people's orientations reflect what people know about democracy (Shin & Tusalem 2007; Norris 2010). Thus, at the individual level we test the effect of emancipative values on views of democracy against cognitive variables, including people's level of education, their political interest, and the diversity of their information use. Biological sex and age are included as routine demographic controls to partial out confoundations with socio-demographic variables.

Our main independent variable, emancipative values, reflects an emphasis on freedom of choice and equality of opportunities and is measured in a scale range from 0 to 1.0 based on twelve WVS-items as described by Welzel and Inglehart (2010). We measure these values at both the individual level and the societal level. In the latter case we use the arithmetic mean as a measure of a society's central tendency in emancipative values. As has been demonstrated by Welzel (2011), the arithmetic

population mean in emancipative values validly measures a society's central cultural tendency because in each sample the distribution on the emancipative values index is mean-centered and single-peaked.

3.   Findings

3.1   Culture Zone Differences

Figure 3 plots for each culture zone how strongly people support the liberal notion of democracy--before and after taking into account *how exclusively* they support this notion. When ignoring *how exclusively* people support the liberal notion of democracy, it seems as if this notion has universal support. Confirming previous research (Dalton, Jou & Shin 2009), the liberal notion of democracy seems indeed to be equated with the notion of democracy per se. And this appears to be true around the world. The extent to which people define democracy in liberal terms is above .70 scale points (!) in *each* culture zone. Thus, the individuals' notions of democracy vary to only 4 percent between culture zones.

(Figure 3 about here)

But this conclusion only holds as long as one ignores *how exclusively* people support the liberal notion of democracy. Doing otherwise, ratings plummet considerably. Moreover, they plummet to different degrees in different culture zones, making culture zone differences strikingly evident. To be precise, the extent to which people place the liberal over alternative notions of democracy varies from a high of some .60 scale points in the Protestant West to a low of some .10 scale points in the Muslim Core Zone. The individuals' notions of democracy vary to about 20 percent between culture zones, if one takes into account how exclusively people support the liberal notion of democracy. In the Core Muslim Zone, South Asia, and Sub-Saharan Africa this is the least the case. While these culture zones seem to share a liberal notion of democracy with the West *before* further qualification, *after* qualifying their definitions for how exclusively liberal they are, a big rift occurs between these culture zones and the 'West.'

With desires for democracy, we make a similar observation. Figure 4 depicts per culture zone the average strength of people's desire for democracy--*before* and *after* we qualify it for how exclusively people support the liberal notion of democracy. Without further qualifications, it seems that the desire for democracy is similarly strong across the globe. In all culture zones, the desire for democracy scores at least at .70 scale points. Again, the individuals' desire for democracy varies to only 4 percent between culture zones. After qualification, the picture changes drastically once more. Desire levels are generally much more modest and they vary considerably between culture

zones. As before, people of the Protestant West show the strongest liberally motivated desire level, scoring at about .50 scale points. And once more, people in the Muslim Core Zone are found at the bottom end, at a score of .10. Liberal desires for democracy vary to about 20 percent between culture zones.

(Figure 4 about here)

Figure 5 plots per culture zone at what level people rate their society's level of democracy--before and after qualifying these ratings for how critically they are, relative to a society's actual level of democracy. The pattern is familiar. Before further qualifications, ratings occur in a rather limited range between .55 and .70 scale points, except for people in the Ex-communist East who fall outside this range (with a low rating of about .45 scale points). Apart from this exception, people throughout various culture zones rate their society's level of democracy favorably. But the fact that people in Sub-Saharan Africa and the Core Muslim Zone rate their societies just as democratic as people in the West, appears odd when one recognizes that most societies' actual democracy level in Sub-Saharan Africa and the Core Muslim Zone is very low. Apparently, many people in these societies overrate their societies' level of democracy. They rate democracy uncritical. Thus, qualifying people's ratings of democracy for how critical they rate democracy related to the actual level of democracy, produces again an entirely different picture, opening a wide chasm between the most critical rating in the English West (.62 scale points) and the least critical rating, once more, in the Core Muslim Zone (.30 scale points).

(Figure 5 about here)

These results question Inglehart and Norris's (2003) refusal of an earlier claim by Huntington (1996) that in questions of democracy there is a cultural rift between Muslim and Western societies. In fact, there is such a rift—indeed a quite pronounced one. Yet, it becomes visible only after further qualifications of otherwise superficial measures of democratic orientations.

3.2   The Effect of Emancipative Values without Controls

It is not culture zones themselves that vary these more qualified orientations towards democracy. Culture zones only seemingly do so because they differ in another factor that is behind people's orientations towards democracy: emancipative values. If we replace culture zones with culture zone mean scores in emancipative values, these mean scores explain exactly the variance in people's views of democracy that seemed to

be captured by culture zones. This holds true for all three aspects of people's view of democracy: how exclusively liberal they define democracy, how strong their desire for democracy is, and how critically they rate their society's actual level of democracy.

To illustrate how emancipative values shape people's orientations towards democracy, we categorize societies for the prevalence of emancipative values, distinguishing three broad groups of societies. Each group includes about one third of the respondents interviewed in round five of the WVS. The first group, labeled 'weakly emancipative societies,' covers societies whose mean emphasis on emancipative values is in a range from .23 to .38 scale points. The second group, 'moderately emancipative societies,' includes societies with a mean emphasis on emancipative values from .38 to .47 scale points. 'Strongly emancipative societies' are those with a mean emphasis on emancipative values from .47 to .73 scale points. Using this classification, Figure 6 plots the strength of the individual respondents' desire for democracy against the strength of their emphasis on emancipative values, separately for weakly, moderately, and strongly emancipative societies.

(Figure 6 about here)

The base levels in the desires for democracy are very high, above the level of .80 scale points. And whether a society is weakly, moderately, or strongly emancipative in its general tendency does not vary the base levels in people's desire for democracy significantly. As the slopes show, stronger emancipative values strengthen the desire for democracy slightly. But in a monotonical way this is true only for weakly and strongly emancipative societies, while in moderately emancipative societies individual-level emancipative values strengthen the desire for democracy only towards the high end of emancipative values. In general, it is obvious that the relation between emancipative values and the desire for democracy operates in the expected direction but the relation is rather weak. One conclusion of this pattern might be that, without further qualification, desires for democracy are relatively meaningless, which is mirrored in the patternlessness of their relationship with values.

(Figure 7 about here)

Looking at the more sensical aspects in people's orientations towards democracy, a clearer pattern surfaces. Figure 7 plots how exclusively individuals support a liberal notion of democracy in weakly, moderately, and strongly emancipative societies under consideration of these individuals' own emancipative values. In each of the three types of society there is a pronounced upward slope indicating that people with stronger emancipative values define democracy more exclusively liberal. Moreover, the base-level on which this slope unfolds elevates with the overall emancipative tendency of a

society. And the slope steepens with a society's overall emancipative tendency. In numbers, if we move from individuals with the weakest to individuals with the third-strongest possible emphasis on emancipative values within weakly emancipative societies, this increases the exclusively liberal notion of democracy by .11 scale points, from .56 to .67. Moving in this category to strongly emancipative societies increases the liberal notion of democracy by another .13 scale points, from .67 to .80. Moving finally within these societies from the third-strongest to the very strongest emphasis on emancipative values increases the liberal notion of democracy by another .05 scale points, from .80 to .85. Thus, the joint individual-level and societal-level impact of emancipative values varies people's liberal notion of democracy by about .30 scale points on a scale whose maximum theoretical range is 1.0.

(Figure 8 about here)

Figure 8 illustrates how emancipative values vary people's critical rating of democracy. Again, strong effects are evident, but this time, the overall emancipative tendency of a society varies people's critical rating of democracy more strongly than do the individuals' own emancipative values. Moving among weakly emancipative societies from individuals in the weakest possible category of emancipative values to individuals in the third-strongest category, people's critical rating of democracy increases by .08 scale points, from .28 to .36. Moving from here to strongly emancipative societies, the critical rating of democracy increases by another .22 scale points, from .36 to .58. Moving from here to individuals with the strongest possible emphasis on emancipative values brings only another .03 scale points increase in the critical rating of democracy, yielding .61 scale points.

The combined individual-level and societal-level impact of emancipative values varies how critical people rate their society's level of democracy to about the same extent as it varies their liberal notion of democracy, namely by .33 scale points. But in contrast to people's liberal notion of democracy, their critical rating of democracy is more strongly affected by a *society's* overall emancipative tendency than by the *individuals'* own emancipative values. A possible explanation why this is so, is that the rating of one's society's level of democracy sets the given society as a common reference point, so the bigger differences are visible between than within societies.

In the next step, we want to look at how the qualification of people's desire for democracy by their liberal notion of democracy and by their critical rating of democracy is varied by emancipative values at the individual level and the societal level. What we are looking at is, thus, the 'critical-liberal desire for democracy,' which is high when people have a strong desire for democracy and at the same time define democracy exclusively liberal and rate it critical. The critical-liberal desire for democracy is low when any of its components is low.

(Figure 9 about here)

Figure 9 shows how emancipative values vary the critical-liberal desire for democracy. Again, emancipative values vary people's view of democracy at both the individual level and the societal level, and this time equally strong at both levels, which is logical because the measure includes one component that is more strongly varied by individual-level emancipative values (liberal definitions of democracy) and another that is more strongly varied by societal-level emancipative values (critical ratings of democracy). In numbers, moving within weakly emancipative societies from individuals with the weakest possible emphasis on emancipative values to the third strongest emphasis on these values, increases the critical-liberal desire for democracy by .10 scale points, from .11 to .21. Moving from here to strongly emancipative societies, yields an increase in people's critical-liberal desire for democracy by another .20 scale points, from .21 to .41. Finally, moving to individuals with the strongest possible emphasis on emancipative values within strongly emancipative societies, still yields an increase in people's critical-liberal desire for democracy of another .08 scale points, from .41 to .49. Thus, the combined individual-level and societal-level impact of emancipative values varies people's critical-liberal desire for democracy by .38 scale points.

3.3 The Effect of Emancipative Values after Controls

The multi-level models in Table 2 confirm these findings with more statistical precision, testing several rival explanations. In the following, we focus on the last model because it explains the most information-rich and most qualified orientation towards democracy: the critical-liberal desire for democracy. On average, people's critical-liberal desire for democracy scores at .27, which is almost exactly at about a fourth of the possible maximum. Individual-level emancipative values add a .11-fraction of their score to the critical-liberal desire, which means an added value of exactly .11 when emancipative values score at maximum 1.0.

(Table 2 about here)

This is by far the strongest individual-level contribution to a critical-liberal desire, stronger than the effects of information diversity, political interest, and formal education. This is remarkable because the latter three are important indicators of cognitive mobilization, from each of which one would assume that it creates greater awareness of democracy's defining features and makes people less naïve and more critical. As the positive coefficients of all three of these variables show, this is indeed the

case. Yet, emancipative values trump the effects of these cognitive variables clearly. Even the combined contribution of information diversity, political interest, and formal education to a critical-liberal desire for democracy is smaller than that of emancipative values. Views of democracy seem indeed to be primarily an evaluative matter rather than a purely cognitive matter. Accordingly, we should avoid giving people's responses to democracy questions a too strongly *cognitive* reading, namely what people know about democracy. We should rather give such responses an *evaluative* reading: what people want democracy to be.

At the societal level, a .68-fraction of a society's overall emancipative tendency adds to people's critical-liberal desire for democracy, which is a by far stronger and more significant contribution than that of a society's democratic tradition (which only adds a .07 fraction of its given score). Hence, critical-liberal desires for democracy are by no means 'endogenous' to the endurance of democracy. This type of a desire does not have to be learnt within pre-existing democratic institutions. It is nurtured by emancipative values, which in turn are driven—as Welzel and Inglehart (2010) have shown—by knowledge development rather than the democratic tradition.

The multi-level model also shows that societal-level emancipative tendencies strengthen the individual-level effect of emancipative values on people's critical-liberal desire for democracy. A .30-fraction of the product score of an individual's own emancipative values and the respective society's general emancipative tendency adds to people's critical-liberal desire for democracy. This illustrates a 'contextual self-enforcement' mechanism: emancipative values have an inherent impetus towards a critical-liberal desire for democracy but this impetus unfolds more strongly when a society's general emancipative tendency is more pronounced.

The democratic tradition moderates the effect of emancipative values only weakly: just a .08-fraction of the product score of an individual's emancipative values and the respective society's democratic tradition adds to people's critical-liberal desire for democracy. Evidently, emancipative values increase people's critical-liberal desire for democracy, and whether the respective society has a rich or poor democratic tradition does not substantially alter this effect.

As the other models in Table 2 show, similar findings apply to the constituents of the critical-liberal desire for democracy. Only the not further qualified desire for democracy (see the first model in Table 2) sticks out as it shows a much weaker determination pattern. But as said, without further qualification, the desire for democracy is in and by itself pretty meaningless. And this is echoed by a weak determination pattern (i.e., smaller effect sizes and less explained variation). In any case, the hypotheses outlined in section 2 are by and large confirmed.

3.4   Integration with Prior Findings

Various recent contributions by Inglehart, Klingemann, Alexander and Welzel have shown that emancipative values are strongly shaped by knowledge development, much more than by democratic traditions. These works have also demonstrated that emancipative values favor democratic outcomes, leading to higher levels of substantive democracy. In this chapter we have seen that emancipative values strongly shape critical-liberal desires for democracy. The latter finding raises the suspicion that emancipative values affect substantive democracy because they generate critical-liberal desires for democracy.

Unfortunately, no causality test can be performed with critical-liberal desires for democracy because this variable is not available longitudinally. It was only measured once so far. However, if the suspicion is correct, we should at least find that substantive democracy correlates at least as closely with critical-liberal desries for democracy as it correlates with emancipative values. Welzel and Klingemann (2009) have shown an r = .83 correlation between emancipative mass values and substantive democratic rights. This is a remarkable correlation. But the critical-liberal desire for democracy correlates at r = .94 (!) with substantive democratic rights. Under any standards, this is an exceptionally strong link.

(Figure 10 about here)

For illustrative purposes, the right-hand diagram in Figure 10 visualizes the link between the critical-liberal desire for democracy and substantive democratic rights, next to the almost as strong link between emancipative values and the critical-liberal desire in the left-hand diagram (a correlation of r = .91).

As said, correlation is not causation and in the absence of longitudinal evidence it is impossible to determine the direction in a correlation. But these links are way too strong to be just flukes and the human empowerment model provides at least a theoretical guideline in which direction to interpret them. In this framework, the direction of effects is from emancipative values to critical-liberal desires for democracy to substantive democratic rights. To interpret these links in the opposite direction is more implausible. For instance, to argue that critical-liberal demands for democracy generate emancipative values rather than the other way round does not make sense because the orientations addressed by emancipative values are closer to the respondents' every-day life experience than the sophisticated political judgements covered by critical-liberal desires for democracy. By all means of plausibility, sophisticated political evaluations take shape after and in dependence of every-day life orientations rather than the other way round.

What about the relation between critical-liberal desires for democracy and substantive democracy? To interpret this relation in the opposite direction to the

human empowerment model, namely as an effect from substantive democracy to critical-liberal desires for democracy, is even more implausible. It would imply that elites provide substantive democracy first and then this instills a critical-liberal spirit into people. This way of reasoning is inherently unconvincing. As power holders, elites have a rational positional interest to maximize power. Nearly every model of elite behavior and elite preferences supports this assumption—an assumption that is well anchored in basic sociological models of how social position affects interests (see Putnam 1979; Przeworski 1992; Boix 2003; Acemoglu & Robinson 2006). Thus, there is every reason to assume that, in the default case, elites tend to give away as little power as possible. Consequently, if there is no or little pressure from the wider public on elites to institute and respect people's democratic freedoms, it is unlikely that the elites institute democracy and, if they do it, that they do it in a non-substantive manner. For conceding democracy is an entirely unnecessary cut into the elites' power base in the absence of public pressures. So far, there is no longitudinal evidence to decide these interpretive questions empirically. It is up to future research to do so.

CONCLUSION

Research on people's orientations towards democracy has taken some interesting turns. When comparative survey research began to extend its reach beyond the Western world, scholars noted with excitement that the global democratization wave was accompanied by widespread support for democracy around the world. But under the assumption of congruence theory that a regime's nature reflects its people's regime preferences, this finding uncovered a paradox: in many places, strong and widespread democratic preferences coexist with lack or complete absence of democracy--without any signs of regime instability. We call this the *coexistence paradox*.

There are two intellectual reactions to the coexistence paradox. On one hand, researchers doubt that democratic preferences in regimes without democracy represent "true" preferences for democracy. People in these regimes probably have a twisted understanding of democracy under which they mistakenly judge their regime as democratic when it is not. In this case, people's democratic regime preferences are compatible with the regime's lack of democracy. This solution of the coexistence paradox is often linked with an institutional learning argument: a "true" preference for democracy, i.e. one that is enlightened by what democracy really is about, can only emerge under the persistence of democracy.

On the other hand, researchers examined empirically how people outside the West understand democracy. The results seemed encouraging, showing that most people outside the West understand democracy primarily in liberal terms, that is, in terms of the freedoms that empower people to govern themselves. If taken seriously,

this finding contradicts the institutional learning argument. And it can be reconciled with the coexistence paradox only if we assume that people's regime preferences are irrelevant to their regime's nature. Indeed, there is a widely believed "victimization theory": most people do want democracy and do understand it correctly but in many parts of the world they have the bad luck to be ruled by corrupt despots who deny their desires for freedoms and democracy.

Both the victimization theory and the institutional learning approach provide a solution of the coexistence paradox. Both solutions give up congruence theory but they do it for contradictory reasons. Unfortunately, both reasons are wrong, and so is the abandoning of congruence theory.

Victimization theory is wrong in its assumption that there are no major cultural differences in people's understanding of democracy. The institutional learning approach is wrong in the assumption that such differences primarily reflect differences in the experience with democracy. Let's detail these points a bit more.

In line with victimization theory, we find only minor cultural differences in people's understanding of democracy, if we look at how strongly people endorse just a liberal understanding of democracy. But in contradiction to victimization theory, we find major cultural differences, if we look more specifically at how exclusively people endorse a liberal understanding of democracy, relative to rival understandings that many people endorse at the same time. It is evident then that where the liberal understanding does not clearly stick out from rival understandings, people's preference for democracy can be instrumentalized for non-democratic goals in the name of democracy. Where this is the case we find overt democratic preferences to coexist with lack or even the absence of democracy.

The institutional learning approach, for its part, is right in assuming major cultural differences in people's understanding of democracy. But the approach is wrong in the assumption that these differences reflect differences in the experience with democracy, such that people define democracy the more exclusively in liberal terms, the longer the democratic tradition of their society is. Instead, notions of democracy are directed away from rival definitions and focused with increasing sharpness on the liberal definition, under the combined individual-level and societal-level impact of emancipative values. To be sure, emancipative values do not very strongly affect the strength of people's desire for democracy, neither at the individual level nor the societal level. But they do powerfully affect the *nature* of this desire, basing it on an exclusively liberal notion of democracy. With this change in the understanding of democracy, people's desire for democracy is highly unlikely to be mobilized for non-democratic goals in the name of democracy.

Furthermore, emancipative values couple people's desire for democracy with a considerably more critical rating of their society's actual level of democracy. Plausibly, when people's desire is coupled with a more critical rating of the given society's actual

level of democracy, it is easier to mobilize this desire for pressures to improve the democratic quality of this society.

The combined individual-level and societal-level impact of emancipative values makes people's desires for democracy more liberal and critical. Because the emergence of emancipative values is driven much more strongly by a society's knowledge development than by its democratic tradition, critical-liberal desires for democracy are more strongly anchored in the logic of human empowerment than in the logic of institutional learning. Accordingly, critical-liberal desires can and do emerge in the absence of democracy, if the process of human empowerment advances but stops just short of installing democracy. As this happens, the pressures to complete the human empowerment process by installing democracy tend to increase, of course.

When people's desires for democracy become more liberal and critical, a population's psychological constitution is reshaped in ways that make it decisively easier to mobilize mass pressures for democratic goals--be it the defense, installment, or substantiation of democracy. In light of this, the extremely strong link between a society's critical-liberal desire for democracy and substantive democracy becomes very plausible. By contrast, to interpret this link as an effect of prior democracy on critical-liberal desires for democracy is not only implausible from the logic of human empowerment. It also seems to be demonstrably false because, under control of emancipative values, democratic traditions show no effect at all on critical-liberal desires for democracy.

At any rate, this chapter presented for the first time evidence that emancipative values shape people's democratic orientations in ways that help to advance human empowerment to its completion. Importantly, these findings solve the coexistence paradox in democratization research: desires for democracy coexist with lack of democracy where these desires lack the critical-liberal fundament provided by emancipative values.

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Table 1. Empirical Dimensions in Popular Definitions of Democracy

ITEMS:	DIMENSIONS:		
	Dimension 1: **Liberal vs. Authoritarian** Definition	Dimension 2: **Populist** Definition	Dimension 3: **Social** Definition
Free Elections	.63		
Equal Rights	.60		
Civil Liberties	.53		
Referenda Votes	.50		
Military Intervention	- .70		
Religious Authority	- .73		
Bread and Butter		.76	
Law and Order		.73	
Economic Redistribution			.68
Welfare State			.62
Explained Variance	24%	14%	12%
N		42,376	

Notes: Entries are factor loadings. Items are standardized for each respondent's mean rating over all items. Factor analysis specified with varimax rotation under the Kaiser criterion. Data source is the country-pooled individual-level dataset of WVS V (2005-8)

Figure 1. A Stepwise Qualification of People's Liberal Understanding of Democracy

Number of Democracy Items

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10

Level of Generalization

I	Free Elections	Equal Rights	Civil Liberties	Referenda Votes	Religious Authority	Military Intervention	Bread and Butter	Law and Order	Economic Redistribution	Welfare State
II	LIBERAL (procedural) Definition				ANTI-LIBERAL (authoritarian) Definition		NON-LIBERAL (populist) Definition		NEUTRAL (social) Definition	
III	LIBERAL versus ANTI-LIBELRAL Definition									
IV	LIBERAL versus ALTERNATIVE Definition									

Figure 2. A Concept of Stepwise Qualification of Demands for Democracy

Figure 3. Definitions of Democracy by Culture Zone Before and After Qualification

Figure 4. Demands for Democracy by Culture Zone Before and After Qualification

Figure 5. Ratings of Democracy by Culture Zone Before and After Qualification

Figure 6.   The Combined Individual-level and Societal-level Effect of Emancipative Values on People's Unqualified Demand for Democracy

Figure 7.   The Combined Individual-level and Societal-level Effect of Emancipative Values on Liberal Definitions of Democracy

Figure 8.   The Combined Individual-level and Societal-level Effects of Emancipative

Values on Critical Ratings of Democracy

Figure 9.   The Combined Individual-level and Societal-level Effects of Emancipative
Values on Critical-Liberal Demands for Democracy

Table 2.   Testing Individual-level and Societal-level Effects of Emancipative Values on Popular Views of Democracy: MLMs

PREDICTORS:	Strength of Demand for Democracy	Liberalness in Notion of Democracy	Criticalness in Rating of Democracy	Liberal Demand for Democracy	Critical Liberal Demand for Democracy
• Intercept	.58 (81.7) ***	.67 (119.6) ***	.45 (40.8) ***	.58 (81.7) ***	.27 (37.4) ***
Societal-level Effects:					
• Democratic Tradition	N. S.	N. S.	.12 (2.4) **	N. S.	.07 (2.1) *
• Emancipative Tendency	.58 (5.4) ***	.55 (6.6) ***	.70 (5.9) ***	.58 (5.4) ***	.68 (8.3) ***
Fixed Individual-level Effects:					
• Female Sex	- .01 (-3.3) ***	- .01 (-4.6) ***	- .01 (-2.4) **	- .01 (-3.3) **	- .01 (-5.5) ***
• Biological Age	.10 (6.0) ***	.05 (6.9) ***	N. S.	.10 (6.0) ***	.05 (6.3) ***
Random Individual-level Effects:					
• Formal Education	.07 (9.7) ***	.05 (9.3) ***	N. S.	.07 (9.7) ***	.03 (8.0) ***
* Democratic Tradition	N. S.	N. S.	N. S.	N. S.	N. S.
* Emancipative Tendency	N. S.	N. S.	N. S.	N. S.	N. S.
• Political Interest	.06 (7.2) ***	.01 (2.3) **	- .04 (-7.6) ***	.06 (7.2) ***	.01 (2.3) **
* Democratic Tradition	N. S.	N. S.	N. S.	N. S.	N. S.
* Emancipative Tendency	N. S.	N. S.	N. S.	N. S.	N. S.
• Information Diversity	.06 (6.6) ***	.02 (3.6) ***	N. S.	.06 (6.6) ***	.02 (4.2) ***
* Democratic Tradition	N. S.	N. S.	N. S.	N. S.	N. S.
* Emancipative Tendency	N. S.	N. S.	N. S.	N. S.	N. S.
• Emancipative Values	.15 (9.5) ***	.12 (10.4) ***	.04 (4.0) ***	.15 (9.5) ***	.11 (11.5) ***
* Democratic Tradition	N. S.	.10 (1.8) *	.11 (2.1) *	N. S.	.08 (1.9) *
* Emancipative Tendency	.77 (3.7) ***	.32 (2.1) **	- .31 (-2.2) *	.77 (3.7) ***	.30 (2.6) **
Reduction of Error:					
Within-societal variation of DV	05.3%	09.2%	03.2%	10.1%	09.1%
Between-societal variation of DV	08.9%	70.5%	69.3%	66.6%	80.9%
Variation in effect of values	27.9%	45.9%	07.7%	45.1%	48.5%
N (number of observations)	44,201 respondents in 45 societies				

Notes: Models estimated with HLM 6.01. Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients with T-ratios in parentheses. Individual-level variables are group-mean-centered, societal-level variables are grand-mean-centered.

Figure 10. The Three Key Links Underlying Democracy